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Chapte.r V (Part A) 
The .i:.Iechanisms for Containing Imports: 
The sxstem during 1971 and a Retrospective Look at Its Evolution (Import Controls)* 
We now come to the cornerstone of the Colombian system for restraining 
the demand for imports: the controls require registration of all imports 
with the relevant authority, which is now INCOMEX, invested with the power 
to prohibit or requiring prior approval of import trans.actions. This 
chapter will first explain the terms frequently used in the Colombian import 
licensing system, to be followea. by a sketch of its historical evolution. 
The core of the chapter is a detailed examination of how the system worked 
circa 1970-71, including a..'1 attempt to quantify its decision-making process. 
This will be followed by a look at some of the effects of the whole import­
repressing system, including tools discussed earlier, on the Colombian 
economy. Although the focus of attention is on merchandise imports, the 
chapter will close with a discussion of the exchange controls designed 
to repress the demand for im,orted services, and regulate capital flows, 
inward as well as outward. 
Some Key Definitions 
Tl1e Colom.biar1 state 1~ecords tl1e import process at several points: 
it first requires the registration of all intentions to import goods with 
INCOMEX, at fob values, except for 
11minor" imports; those intentions 
become registered only after they are approved. For items in the free list 
approval is granted almost automatically. When the goods come into the 
country and clear customs, they are recorded at customs, cif values. 
Finally, when the importer draws foreign excha.'1ge from the Central Barut, 
those excha...~ge disbu~sements are noted. To obtain foreign exchange, the 
importer must present proof that goods have cleared customs. Table V-1 
shows these aifferent magnitudes for recent years; allowing for lags, 
-2-
registrations and customs values are roughly equal. It appears that the 
cif/fob differential is offset by the cancellations, post-registration 
discounts, non-use, etc., of some registrations. Exc~ange disbursements 
are lower than import values for the simple reason that many imports are 
financed by foreign credits, or covered by compensation agreements; the 
servicing of such debt is recorded under other items. 
The lag between application for an import license and its approval 
which implies registration, for goods in the prior list, has fluctuated 
COI).Siderably during postwar II. During 1970-71 it was of about one month 
to one month and a half. 'I'he lag between registration and the time 
the goods actually go through customs depends of course on the nature 
of the commodity; it is saicl to average 4 or 5 months. 'Ihe lag between 
arrival and excha.~ge disbursement, for those imports not financed by long 
term credit, is cf about one month, under normal conditions. 
The average link between actue.l imports (customs) and registrations 
can be seen in the following regressior., using annual dollar data for 
1950 through 1970: 
{l) [CUSTOMS\ = 80.8 + 0.66 [REGISTR.]+ + 0.23 [REGISTR.]t-l 
(1.6) (6.4) u (1.8) 
2
R = 0.87 
F-test = 58.8 
DW = 2.9 
From 1962 thr01..1Gh 1969 this regression yields alternating under-
and over-estimates of 2.ctual imports; thus, predicted customs imports for 
1963 are 9 percent above actual ones, those for 1964 are 6 percent below, 
in 1965 they are 16 percent above, etc. 'Ihe missing expla'l'latory variable, 
Table V-1 -2a-
Merchandise Imports; Registrations. Customs Values 
and Exchange Disbursements, 1963-71 
(Annual Averages in Million Current US Dollars) 






Special import-export systems 
Non-reimbursa~ 
With foreign loans 
Other 
Merchandise imports (customs. cif) 
Ex.change Disbursements for Imports (fob) 
1963-66 1967-70 1971 
552.1 706.2 784.8 
484.4 596.1 710.4 
390.8 414.9 618.1 
38.8 60.0 38.0 
20.2 86.o 13.0 
27.0 16.9 15.3 
7.6 18.3 26.0 
110,l 74.4 
18.9 71.7 35.9 
48.7 38.5 38.6 
555.0 667.4 
475,3 612.7 
Sources and Method: BdlR - RdBdlR, several issues. 
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it was at first thought, was the past, actual and expected exchange rate 
behavior, on the grounds that expected devaluation, say, would induce 
holders of registered licenses to hurry-up the arrival and thus the 
payment for the merchandise. But experiments putting exchange rate changes 
in regression (1), lagged backwards and forward, yielded poor results. 
The best is the following: 
(2) [CUST0MS)t = 92.3 + 0.74 [REGISTR.]t + 0.11 [REGISTR.)t-l 
{1.8) (6.1) (o.6) 
+ C.74 [EXCH. RATE]t+l 
(1.2) 
R2 = o.88 
F-test = 40 .8 
DW = 3.1 
In this regression, the actual percentage chanee in the rea1 average 
import exchange rate a year ahead presumably picks ur, (realized) 
expectations about its movements. But clearly there are ad hoc factors 
influencing in a given year the lag between customs flow and registration; 
for example, a plausible reason for regression (1) to predict for 1963 a customs 
flow 9 percent below the actual one relates to doubts regarding how long 
import liberalization would last, provoking a quick realization of registered 
intentions to import. And once this happens for a year, the opposite can 
be expected for the next. 
Regression (1) indicates that two-thirds of registrations are, on average, 
turned into actual imports within the same year, suggesting an average lag 
of 4 months. Note, however, that the coefficients for both registration 
varia"bles add up to only O. 89, and that longer lags yielded insignificant 
results. 
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INCOMEX and its predecessors have classified registrations according 
to: (a) manner of payments to which they give rise; (b) types of 
importers; and (c) particular regime to which imports are subject. 
The classification used at present as to the manner of payments for 
imports is presented in Table V-1. The reimbursable vs. non-reimbursable 
distinctions is less helpful than it appears, because although all non­
reimbursable imports are financed by long- or medium-term credits, or 
involve imports of direct foreign investors or gifts and donations, not 
all reimbursable imports are covered by current exchange earnings. The 
distinction turns out to hinge on whether the foreign exchange used to 
pay for imports is or is not at the disposal of the Banco de la Republica, 
directly or indirectly. Thus, imports financed by AID credits deposited 
wiLh the CeHL:t·al Bank .are reiw.l>u.rl:lable, h•hile those using IBRD or IADB 
loans, whose cash is kept in Washington, are considered non-reimbursable. 
Imports from cou..'1'1tries with which Colombia has bilateral payments agreements, 
as well as those from LA.FTA, come under the reimbursable category, as 
of foreign investment involving directly machinery imports is placed under 
"non-reimbursable"; other parts which may involve a dollar inflow deposited 
in the Central Bank to pay for other imports would come under "reimbursable." 
The distinction according to ty2es of importers is of more general 
interest. Published import registrations are subdivided into three 
categories: industry, commerce and official. For internal use, INCOMEX 
has a somewhat more complicated classification; there is a fourth major 
group, !!occasional" requests, made up mainly by import applications from 
construction firms, professionals, private individuals and even some public 
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agencies, as well as other minor subdivisions. In published registrations, 
"i.ndustry" includes imports to be transformed and used as imports directly 
by those requesting the license; "commerce II those to be resold by established 
commercial firms, without substantially altering the imported item. Approved 
"occasional n requests appear mainly under "commerce" in published registration. 
The "official" category covers imports destined for the public sector; 
however, INCOMEX subdivides these applications into commercial and 
industrial categories for internal use, and published data also contain 
under "industryn imports of some public enterprises, such as the steel 
mill of Paz del Rio. Partly as a result of foreign 11tied aid", and partly 
due to protectionist pressures, by law all official imports must go 
through the prior license procedure, i.e., they are ex-c.luded frcm the 
free list. 
Colombia has no state-trading agencies outside the quasi-official 
Coffee Growers I Federation (il: principle a private group) and IDEMA, in 
charge of distributing basic foodstuffs. The former handles directly the 
major share of coffee exports, while the latter frequently imports in 
bulk, particularly from countries whose export trade is in state hands. 
For example, during recent years IDEivT.A has imported Chilean apples. 
Only approved (registered) license requests are published; during 
1971, of all registered reimbursable imports 56 percent fell under the 
"industry II category, 24 percent under ncommerce II and 20 percent under 
"official." For 1970 the corresponding figures were 53, 29 and 19 percent, 
respectively. It may be estimated that during 1971 total requests, including 
those rejected, followed roughly the same breakdown, with the share for 
commerce slightly higher than these for industry and official. 
., . 
The high share of Dnport demand and of actual imports accounted for 
by direct users, whether private or public, is remarkable, and reflects 
the low share of consumer goods in the import bill. Note also that 
given what is known about import prohibitions and INCOMEX policies, 
a large fraction of the ex-ante demand does not bother to apply for 
import permits • Furthermore, many small enterpreneurs and individuals 
not used to dealing with government bureaucracies may get discouraged even 
when their potential applications have a good chance of being approved. 
All importable items fall under one of three regimes or lists: 
1the prohibited, the free or the prior license list. It will be seen 
that the coverage o~ these lists fluctuated considerably during the 1960s. 
During 1971, about 16 percent of all items (including subcategories) 
into which the Colombian tarif'i' is divided were placed on the prohibited 
list. Table V-2 shows thst list includes candidates for agricultural 
protectionism in rich and poor countries alike {e.g., meat, corn, dairy 
products, etc.}, luxury products (e.g., furs, precious metals, jewelry, 
velvets, etc.), anC items for which prohibitions appear redundant (e.g., 
coffee, cocoa, sugar, clothes, wood manufactures, etc.). An eccentric 
who wished to import coffee i:rito Colombia, incidentally, would face not 
only a flat prohibition, but aJ.so a d.uty of 85 percent (if the bean is 
untoasted) or 170 Percent (for toasted beans), plus a prior deposit of 
130 percent. The list also includes items such as arms and habit-forming 
drugs. Note that while among the tariff chapters identified in Table V-2, 
which accou::.1t for two--thirds of s.ll p.·ohibited. items and contain mainly 
consumer goods, the percentage of pror_ibitions was 66, for the rest of 
the tariff only 6 percent of t:::_2 categories were :prohibited. Under special 
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Table V-2 
Examples of Tariff Chapters with Abundant Prohibitions Circa 1971 
Total Items in Prohibited 
Chapter Number and Description the Chapter Items 
2 Meat and edible offal 20 20 
3 Fish, shellfish and molluscs 18 10 
4 Milk and dairy products, eggs, honey 16 13 
7 Edible legumes, vegetables, plants 
roots, tubes 24 20 
8 Edible fruits and peels 74 69 
9 Coffee(!), Tea, and Spices 26 10 
11 Milling foodstuffs, malt, starches 34 29 
12 Oilseeds, sundry seeds, industrial and 
medicinal plants, fodder 61 27 
15 fl.ci~e.l. and vegetable oils, fats 88 54 
18 Cocoa and its products 7 6 
19 Pastries, products based on flour, cereals, 
etc. 10 6 
20 Preserves of vegetables, plants, fruits 24 21 
21 Sundry foodstuffs 18 11 
22 Beverages, alcoholic drinks, vinegar 33 11 
41 Furs, leather and their manufactures 26 11 
44 Wood and its manufactures 35 25 
58 Rugs, felps, ribbons, embroidery, velvets, 
6L 49tulle, .etc • 
60 Knitted goods 25 24 
61 Other clothing ~nd apparel 23 22 
68 Ceramics, glass, cement and their manufactures 46 15 
71 Precious stones, metals and their manufactures 38 16 
70~( 469Sub-total ,......,,-
t:::.):;)Other chapters 3,643 
704TOTAL 4,350 
Sources and Method: Information obtained from Arancel·de Aduanas, OE- cit. 
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circumstances goods in the prohibited list can be imported, as under 
the "Plan Vallejo. 11 During 1971, for example, nearly one percent of all 
registered reimbursable imports were items in the prohibited list. It 
may be noted also that some goods are prohibited for most purposes, but 
subject to prior licenses for a few other, e.g., some tY)?es of paper, 
prohibited except for use of the printing and publishing establishments. 
The free list, besides Plan Vallejo and LAFTA imports, included during 
August 1971 only about 150 items, or 3 percent of all categories in the 
tariff. However, free list items accounted for 29 percent of all registered 
reimbursable imports in 1971 and 23 percent of all imports registered (the 
free list is limited to reimbursable imports). Free list items can be 
brought into Colomliia without a prior license; all that is req_uired, in 
principle, besides payment of duties and prior deposits, is the registration 
of those imports with INCCMEX. Typically such process iS routine, but 
INCOMEX can c.hallenge the dollar prices appearing in the registration; such 
control is justified on grounds of combatting overinvoicing, and can lead 
to denial of registration even of items in the free list. The threat is 
not just theoretical; e.g., some book imports have been held up recently 
for this reason. 
Goods in the free list include primarily some spare parts, certain 
raw materials and intermediate products, scientific and medical eq_uipment, 
and other capital goods. Examples of the latter are harvesters, helicopters, 
chicken incubators, some electrical generators, tractors, many types of 
engines, etc. Among the rest one finds unmanufactured copper, lead, zinc, 
aluminum; some types of steel and nickel sheets; newsprint, etc. Of all 
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tariff items (528) in chapters 84 and 85, which include most electrical 
and non-electrical machinery and equipment, excluding transport, nearly 
10 percent were on the free J.ist. As with the tariff, import controls 
are biased against the importation of used goods; it is explicitly stated 
in the regulations covering the free list that only new and unused 
merchandise can be brought in under that list. 2 
Goods neither in the prohibited for the free list are subject to 
prior licensing, which covers the bulk of imports. Items can be 
moved from one list to another by a simple decision of INCOMEX; so long 
as a given commodity remains in the free list, it could be said that its 
demand depends only on income, prices, tariffs, etc., but in reality this 
is so only so long as that demand stays within the limits foreseen by the 
authorities. It has rwL lieen u11usual in the past for the control authorities 
to curtail or eliminate the free list when demand pressure became too great; 
this is why in Chapter II no distinction was made among prohibited, prior 
license and free import lists when deriving the overall import function. 
ThP.rP. i l'l A. f'11rt.hPr distinction, primarily applied to 
between global licenses and ordinary or regular licenses. Global licenses, 
started in 1965, apply basically to imports of capital goods for projects 
involving the creation modernization or expansion of capacity, exceeding 
US$40,000 and, if granted, are simply an approval in principle to import. 
After obtaining a global license, an importer is typically given about 3 
months to apply for ordinary licenses; extensions, however, are possible, 
and longer time limits are also given depending on the nature of the project. 
When a company is planning new investment, for example, it submits a 
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description of the project, in the form of a feasibility study with a 19 
page questionnaire, together with estimated import requirements to 
INCOMEX, which has a special section for analyzing those projects. The 
motivation given for global licenses is to avoid having a situation in 
which projects are delayed by having, say, 90 percent of import requirements 
approved, but a few critical requests rejected. Once a global license 
has been obtained, the normal expectation is that all required licenses, 
which must still be presented for each individual project, will be approved. 
Another advantage associated with global licenses is that they are typically 
accompanied by the irgravamen 1'.1.nico, 11 or single tariff. By this procedure, 
the importer will pay a single rate of duty on all capital goods, a rate 
which is below the average for all the individual items. 
Global licenses are not obligatory ±'or investment projects, but highly 
convenient; they give the government an important tool to control private 
capital formation, and enterpreneurs a way to commit the government to the 
realization of a project. In the difficult year of 1967, global licenses 
worth US$48 .4 Million 1-rere approved and US$7 .4 were rejected; in 1969 appi~ovals 
reached US$110.2 Million, and the corresponding number for 1970 was $84.7 
Million. In contrast, actual imports of all capital goods during 1969-70 
averaged US$346 .1 Million annually. 
A Historical Sketch of the Import Control System3 
In spite of an increase in the dollar value of Colombian exports from 
$81 Million in 1938 to $284 Million in 1948, more than a three-fold 
increase in ten years, foreign exchange reserves declined during 1946-48, 
and the import and exchange controls which began during the Great Depression 
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became increasingly detailed and complex. As noted in Chapter I, exchange 
rate policy appears to have become frozen by the peculiar circumstances 
of World war and postwar II, leading to an overvaluation trend. 
By 1949, import licenses were granted up to the limits of individual 
exchange quotas computed on the basis of the importer's production, sales 
and other criteria. During 1950, the allocation of exchange quotas 
to individual importers began to be determined on a basis of their captial, 
expenses and total personnel. For some co:m.'nodities, such as drugs and 
pharmaceuticals, import licenses were issued w:i.thout' regard for the exchange 
quotas. Thus, the non-reimbursable categor;y was already present, and 
at that time it probably included many imports financed with dollars acquired 
in the black market; licenses for the purchase of certain imports were 
given preferential trec1.tment. Most imports were effected at the basic 
exchange rate of 1.96 Pesos, but had to bear varying amounts of exchange 
taxes ( from 10 to 30 percent). Import of machinery and equipment were 
effected at mixed rates, made up of varying proportions of the basic 
selling rate, and of the exchange certificate market, which in December 1949 
stood at 2.86 Pesos. !!Luxury" ir.iports went through this latter market, 
and also bore exchange taxes. 
This system was conducive to tinkering and proliferation of multiple 
rates, and up until March 1951 numerous adjustments were made to 
exchange taxes, proportions in the mixed rates, goods which could be 
imported outside individual exchange quotas, etc. Apparently, there were 
considerable criticisms of the efficiency, fairness and nonesty with which 
the system was run, and one of the directors of the ccntrol mechanism was 
even assasinated. 
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On March 1951 the basic import rate was devalued to 2.5 Pesos for 
US dollar, and a prohibited list of about 1,200 specified luxury or 
locally-produced items was created. But practically all licensing restrictions 
on imports were removed, and major exchange taxes, as well as mixed or multiple 
rates were abolished. Prior import deposits were also liberalized, and 
stood at only 10 percent during 1952. Imports still required registration, 
but this became a routine matter; if the application met all legal require­
ments registration was automatic. A minor stamp tax of 3 percent was 
collected on all registrations; a few imports req_uired prior approval of 
certain ministries (e.g., for health reasons, as in many industrialized 
countries). Even some items in the prohibited list could be imported if 
they originated in countries having either a -balanced. trade or barter 
and payment agreements with CoJ_o:r!lbia, and other prohibitions were lifted 
if "export vouchers n (introduced in August 1952) issued. for certain minor 
exports were used to finance their importation, so long as those exports 
and imports related to the same foreign country. In short, the March 1951 
simplification and liberalization of the control mechanism, coupled with 
favorable conditions in the world coffee market, ush~red the freest postwar 
II era for Colombian importers, which was to last, with minor modifications, 
through the end of 1954. During part of 1954 even the prohibited list 
was abolished, and replaced with a flat 40 percent tax. 
As the domestic boom got out of hand a-rid coffee prices began to 
waver late in 1954, the authorities chose to hold on to the 2.5 Pesos 
rate and reinforce and reintroduce exchange taxes and regulations, without, 
however, restricting most import registrations. First in October 1954 
and then more thoroughly in February 1955 imports were reclassified and 
"stamp" taxes on import registrations were drastically increased, while 
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prohibitions were once again enforced. Six import categories were created: 
Pr~ferential (raw materials for essential industries), other raw materials 
and essential products, essential durable and semidurable goods, less 
essential goods, importable only from certain countries, specified non­
essential goods and prohibited (luxury) goods. Stamp taxes went from 3 
to 100 percent. Imports of some foodstuffs were to be handled. only by a 
special corporation. Prior import deposits were raised. Since late 1954, 
the granting of the exchange for import payments was made contingent upon 
arrival of the merchandise in Colombia, a regulation which had been abolished 
in November 1951. 
As import pressure continued to grow, a free market import rate was 
introduced in May 1955; most nontrade transactions and less essential imports 
were shifted to LhaL new market. By the end of 1955, the fluctuating 
free market rate had reached 1+.2 Pesos. The :payments situation, however,, 
continued deteriorating; it appears that at that time attempts at control 
relied mainly on indirect measures, such as stamp taxes, the free market 
rate, etc,, plus exchange control. In other words, "essential" imports 
continued being registered freely and flooded into the country, and they 
remained the bulk of the import bill~ while the queus waiting to buy foreign 
exchange for 2.5 Pesos at the Central Bank became longer. By June 1956, 
authorities gave importers waiting for exchange authcrizations the option 
to buy immediately exchange at the official rate of 2.5 Pesos for half of 
the value of their pending applications, if they obtained the other half 
in the free market, which at that time stood at about 4.7 Pesos. By the 
end of 1956, that rate was 6 .5 Pesos. Tb.e payments crisis provoked in 
October 1956 the closing of the exchange registration office, except for the 
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consideration of applications for vital imports; it was reopened, with 
tighter regulations, and prohibitions in January 1957. Most import 
registrations were also suspended during those months, and their easy 
granting came to an end; from January 1957 on, import control became 
the first and major hurdle faced by potential importers, before they reached 
the exchange window. 
These changes came too late, of course, to avoid a sharp increase 
in Colombian commercial arrears, which began to be noticed late in 1954, 
and by the end of 1956 had. reached roughly $400 Million dollars. The 
payments crisis, falling coffee prices, and domestic inflation cum 
stagnation contributed to the overthrow of the government of General 
Rojas in May 1957. The lesson that exchange controls buttressing a 
pegged rate, without p.ri01· lrnpurt li. ::em; lug, can eai:d.ly lead to 
payments trouble :t..as influenced Colombian import control policy to this day. 
The statilization plan of June 1957 placed all import payments under 
a new certificate rate, which by December 1957 stood at 5 .4 Pesos, abolishing 
the grossly undervalued 2 .5 Pesos rate. Pavments for most imnorts wereV - - ---.,,_- ~ - ~ . 
subject to a 10 percent remittance tax, so the de facto rate reached six 
Pesos. All imports were still subject to registration and lists of 
prohibited, free and prior license imports were established; this control 
system, which with further refinements is the one now· in effect, was 
consolidated by Law 1 of January 1959. Prior exchange registration was 
also enforced systematically beginning in 1957 for import payments, 
requiring submission of import registration plus evidence that the goods 
had entered Colombia. Importers were given the choice of paying using 
a free market (at 6.2 Pesos at the end of 1957) in which case they were 
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exempted from the 10 percent remittance tax. The higher import exchang
e 
rates, and tougher prior import deposits, allowed the relaxation of im
port 
licensing for some commodities; during the second semester of 1957, tor 
example, two thirds of all import registrations were on the free list, 
and only one third (mainly capital goods) fell under the prior license 
list. But the rate of refused requests for goods in the prior license 
list if said to have been high, nearly 40 percent by value of requests 
during those difficult months. 
After the commercial arrears had been liquidated, and the peyments 
crisis and inflationary pressures dampened by the austerity measures of
 
1957 and 1958, growth began to pick up again in a climate of stability. 
Throughout 1959, 1960 and even 1961, import controls remained severe but 
fairly steady; some even saw a t:r:·end toward libcro.lization as exchange 
reserves recovered. Certainly imports recovered steadily from their 1958 
low. But, as already noted in Chapter IV, $UCh optimism also led to an 
abandonment of exchange rate flexibility; in fact, during 1960 the free 
rate, applied mainly to capital movements, invi·sibles and most minor 
exports, came increasingly under fire not only within Colombia but also
 
among international civil servants, who urged its unification with the 
more 11stable 11 certificate rate. During 1961, however, it became obviou
s 
that such unification, at least at the lower certificate rate, would be
 
foolhardy. 
Difficulties in ~he world coffee market continues to be used as the 
By 1960 it was feltmajor justification for rigorous import controls. 
that about one fourth or one third of potential import demand was restr
icted 
by the licensing system, and that this was done more by the flat prohi
bitions, 
frequently of protectionist intent, than b;y rejecti0n of license applications. 
About half of the items in the tariff were at that time in the prohibited 
list; within registered imports, the share of those in the free list had 
declined slightly to 60 percent, from about 65 percent in 1959. The value 
of import license requests rejected as a percentage of the value of all 
license applications fluctuated around 15 percent throughout 1958, 1959 and 
1960. These rates of rejection underestimate the strength of import demand 
not only because of the existence (and changing size) of the prohibited list, 
but also because the Superintendency of Imports, and later INCONEX, made it 
a practice to discourage applications doomed to failure by reacting negatively 
to informal inquiries. The depressed conditions of the world coffee market 
also led Colombian authorities about this time to use the licensing mechanism 
to discriminate by oource of imports, o.s part of bi.lateral deals involving 
mostly new coffee exports. Imports not normally permitted were occasionally 
allowed from bilateral partners (e.g., 2..utomotors, giving the Colombian 
stock of such vehicles a very heterogeneous and :picturesque nature, including 
rural jeeps in urban centers) in exchange for coffee sold at de facto 
discounts perhaps as high as 20 percent. During 1961, about US$30 ~lillion 
worth of imports were licensed under barter and bilateral agreements. 
By early 1962 it became clear that the co:mmitment to a pegged import 
rate would have to be buttressed using other import represaing policies; 
in April 1962 import pr:'.or deposits were raised, and import licensing 
hardened. By September 1962 virtually all imports were made subject to prior 
licensing; and in lJovember new import registrations were corepletely si.:.spended 
for six weeks . 'Ihe free rate, which a:uring the first half of 1960 had remained 
steady at about 6. 8 Fesos, end.eel tnat year at 7 .2, and by December 1961 had 
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reached 8.8 Pesos. It showed great instabj_lity during 1962, and finished 
that year at 11.1 Pesos. 5 
In the new cycle following the devaluation in Hovember 1962 of the 
basic import rate, the expected relaxation of import controls did not last 
long as a result of the failure of that stabilization program to significantly 
change relative prices. The prestige of licensing as the tool to repress 
imports rose as that of exchange rate devaluation su.,k; during 1963 and 1964 it 
became almost unthinkable to again move the 9 Pesos peg applicable to imports; 
even the January 1963 pegging of the 10 Pesos free rate withstood pressures 
until October 1964. IJati.:rally, the share of imports in the free list in 
total registration fell from 60 percent in 1960-61 to about 35 percent in late 
1964 and lower still in early 1965. The time taken to decide on import 
reQuests lengthened, and during the last half of 1964 it reached, on average, 
nearly three months. Prior import deposits were kept in the Central Bank 
longer than usual, going often beyond ten months . By late 1964 about 35 
percent of all license applications were teing refused, and bitter and 
On December 1964 the free list was suspended first for 90 days, but its 
elimination was continued until September 1965; prior exchange registration 
was made more difficult, resulting in a new piling up of commercial arrears. 
Early in 1965 prohibitions were extended, and licensing became increasingly slow 
and difficult, particularly for capital goods. 6 Fresh attempts were made to 
divert both private and official imports toward bilateral partners, 
particularly with capital goods such as acricultural and construction machinery, 
elevators, tractors , trucl:s and other vehicles • Some Colombian trading partners 
which felt injured by these practices, particularly the U.S. and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, made their displeasure known directly and indirectly. 
The chaotic first semester of 1965 gave new ammunition to those wishing 
to rely less on controls and more on a highe1~ import exchange rate. By 
April 1965 average delays in handling import requests reached 6 months, and 
pressures on control authorities mounted. The top political leadership, 
however, remembering the debacle following the devaluation of November 1962, 
fiercely opposed any such move. Thanks to the fine work of the 11.Junta 
Monetaria, 11 a compromise -;;as finally workecl out: on September 1965 the official 
market was divided into a preferential rate, at the old 9 Pesos parity, for 
foodstuffs, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc., and a new intermediate rate 
of 13.5 Pesos, 7 to which less essential imports would be gradually transferred. 
The free rate which had reached 19.2 Pesos i~ August 1965, fell to 17.8 Pesos 
by October 1965, so political authorities could argue, for debating purposes, 
that their actions had actually led to a peso. appreciation. 
On such shaky and tricky foundations was based the most systematic 
attempt at import liberalization attempted in Colombia during postwar II, 
with Colombian and international tP.chni ci 1=1nR think; ng t.hAy had. outfoxed 
what they regarded as an economically illiterate political leadership. Because 
of the lack of candor and clarity with which the plan was launched, a number 
of points were left ambiguous, and were to haunt policy makers a year later. 
In particular, whether or not the plan included a willingness to change 
upwards the 13.5 Peso rate was left fuzzy; in September 1965 such fuzziness 
was part of selling the ps.ckage and avoiding inflationary expectations, 
a H. 1963, but by September 1966 this was a source of irritation between 
Colombians and international creditors. il.mong the latter, some were convinced 
in 1965 that Colombiar2 authoritj_es had corrnm.tted themse.:i..ves, to, if necessary, 
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depreciating the intermediate rate, in line with a policy of exchange 
flexibility, rather than reverse import liberalization. In fact, they 
expected such further devaluations to be necessary, suspecting that the 
13.5 Peso rate was too low. Other architects :and spcnsors of the plan,.· 
one may speculate, probably assumed that impor·t liberalization would 
inevitably drag the authorities, unable to reverse liberalization, to further 
devaluations in the future, whether or not they were willing to consider 
such possibility in September 1965. By this time, it should be noted, 
the Monetary Board had been given the power to make exchange rate adjustments 
at any time and of any size. The free rate was still allowed to fluctuate 
freely, and some hoped that eventually an upward crawling intermediate 
rate would reach and merge with the free rate. The progressive liberalization 
of import controls would test the appropriateness of the 13 .'.) .Peso rate, which 
was to yield if the import surged proved to be too great. A species of 
"chicken II game was set up. 
The original plan called for a removal within six months of prior 
licensing en about half of all imports, 1-rhich e1rPr1+.,1~11y Wt'"\nl C1 hP PxtP.nrlP-il. 
to 65 percent of all imports; it was expected that imports of capital goods 
for industrial plants would be kept under control as part of the mechanism 
for investment planning. In fact the pace of liberalization went even faster. 
The free list was expanded in each of the following dates: September 8, 
November 11, January 27, 1966, February 22, Feburary 28, rfarch 17, July 29, 
and August 21. By this latter date nearly all imports had -been moved to 
the intermediate exchange rate; most imports were now either prohibited 
or in the free list, although some remained subject to prior licensing. 
Furthermore, starting in October 1965, advance import deposits were reduced 
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every month by 5 percent of the rates in force on September 30; the plan 
called for continuing this rhythm until those deposits were eliminated 
in twenty months. In late August 1966, however, it was announced that 
those 5 percent cuts were to be quarterly, not monthly, starting in 
November, 1966. It will be recalled that between September 1965 and 
August 1966, numerous modifications, mainly upward, were also introduced 
in the tariff, in principle to harmonize it with inport liberalization. 
As seen in Table II-2, the customs value of imports surged after 
the fourth quarter of 1965; import registrations had already picked 
up in that quarter. For the whole of 1965, of all registered imports 
only 15 percent had oeen on the free list; the corre~ponding figu~~ for 
1966 was 56 percent. It may be noted that this liberalization did not 
much change the prchibited list. 
The free list, which by October 1966 was accounting for about 80 
percent of all registered imports,rhad totally disappeared by December, 
by which date the liberalization episode appeared to lie thoroughly 
wrecked. This dramatic policy turnaro1111d 1vill be Pv~mi nP.ii in detail in 
the next chapter. Throughout 1967 import controls were rigorously 
enforced; there was practically no free list, and it is said that of 
the total number of import license requests presented, about 40 percent 
were rejected. In terms of value, about 25 percent of total requests 
were turned dmm; the percentage was lower for global and non-reimbursable 
requests, and higher for reimbursable- ones. Steep prior import deposits 
were reintroduced and exchange controls were tightened. Imports dwindled; 
their custom value in 1967 was 26 percent below 1966, while the drop in 
registrations was of 18 percent . Only since May 1968 did the free list 
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regain some significance; free list registrations were only 4 percent of 
all reimbursable import registrations in 1967, rising to 12 percent in 
1968. The liberalization rock continued to be pushed uphill, slowly, 
once again; the free list by 1970 had reached 20 percent of all reimbursable 
registrations (17 percent of all registrations). During 1968 prior import 
deposits began to be lowered once again, a process which has continued 
throughout 1972. 
Beginning in March 1967 the import and exchange control system took 
the basic shape it had circa 1971. It is generally granted that a number 
of administrative improvements were introduced during these years; the 
next section will present a closer look at its operation around 1971. It 
should be borne in mind that the next section is a snapshot of a system 
slowly evolving in the direction oi' liberalization. Indeed, much of the fine 
reputation of the present Colombian system of import control may be due to 
the fact tha it has presided over a situation of gradual relaxation and 
growing exchange availabilities. It is not clear how it would hold up 
tujder a larger gap between ex=ante demand and exchange 
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The Operation of Import Controls during 1971 
All potential importers must present INCOl•lEX with a detailed 
description of the goods they wish to purchase, intended means and timing 
of payment, and must also complete a questionnaire '(following resolution 
15 of 1967) , giving c-ompany information on payroll, number of workers, 
capacity, imports during current and previous three years, income and 
sales taxes paid during current and previous three years, minor exports 
for the same period, previous imports of the products they wish to import, 
inventories of those products and their expected duration, etc. A different 
form must usually ce completed for each commodity, although exceptions 
to this rule are possible; there are slightly different resolution 15 
forms for industry, commerce and official requests. 
The INCOMEX stc:1,ff first checks to see whether all the required 
documentation and information has been presented fully and accurately. 
Besides import description and the resolution 15 form, importers must show 
evidence of tax settlements, and of having carried out required prior 
import deposits. In principle, then, the mechanism of import control 
can reinforce the Treasury's efforts to reduce tax evasion, particularly 
among commercial houses. At this stage, import applications can be returned 
(not officially rejected) on grounds of improper completion of forms. 
INCOMEX
8 
argues that such devolutions: are done on purely technical grounds, 
e.g., because the description of the proposed import is sketchy, which 
may lead to trouble at customs when it arrives in the country, and complains 
that the careless company employees who completed the forms then call 
such devolutions rejections, to protect themselves. Problems arise 
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particularly with new or complex products. In fact, the punctilliousness 
with which INCOMEX insists on the quality of information on import 
requests can be adjusted depending on the pressure of import demand. 
Whether an import request is returned or rejected, the potential importer 
can resubmit a new at once. During 1971, it may be estimated that of 
the total value of requested imports, only about 3 percent were returned 
for containing insufficient information or procedural mistakes. 
If the application is satisfactory in form, the INCOMEX staff next 
examines whether products similar to those requested are produced locally. 
Extensive files on domestic production have been built up during the last 
few years . There is at this point a frank and clear protectionist bias; 
in case of doubt, the presump t::Lon is that local goods are indeed fully 
satisfactory candidates for import-replacement, at least regarding their 
physical attributes. Potential importers whose requests have been turned 
down on these grounds bear the burden of demonstrating to INCOMEX that 
local production is in fact different from possible imports because of 
quality, product specification, etc. Price differences, unless "outrageous," 
are not considered valid grounds for importing. IHCOMEX occasionally 
brings together the potential importer and the local import-competing 
producer, to iron out serious disagreements regarding prices and whether 
or not the good in questi~n has the same quality and specifications. 
INCOMEX officials occasionally visit plants of import-competing firms to 
verify their capacity, output quality, etc., a time-consuming and ad-hoc 
practice. 
As a third step, the INCOl,IBX staff looks closely at the unit dollar 
price of the potential import. The point here is not to keep track of 
I ' 
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margins between Colombian and world prices, but to control overinvoicing 
of raw materials and parts, particularly by subsidiaries of foreign 
companies buying from their parents. INCOMEX and other Colombian 
officials argue that pharmaceutical companies operating in Colombia, for 
example, but owned from abroad, have been shown to have inflated the 
value of their imports of raw materials, as a way of disguising profit 
remittances abroad. 9 Thus, import control emerges also a tool to regulate 
intra-company transfer of pricing, particularly for foreign investors 
in the import competing sector. The need for such regulation, of Course, 
would disappear if those companies were not to receive protection against 
imports of finished products. Even items in the free list may be held up 
if there is suspicion that dollar prices declared in the registration 
request are out of l:Lne with "world11 prlces. 
As much direct foreign investment takes the form of imports of 
machinery and equipment, the registered value of those imports becomes 
later on part of the base on which Colombian regulations compute allowable 
profit remittances abroad. It is thus important for the control system 
to check on the real (international) value of the machinery, typically 
brought in with non-reimbursable licenses. Stories are told of gross 
overvaluation in some license requests, designed to inflate the value of 
foreign investment. 
All of the above procedures are handled by the "Junta de Importaciones 
11 
satff, which does not have the power to reject or accept the applications 
(although, as noted above, they can 11returnj1 applications on procedural 
grounds). That power, including the possibility of approving an application 
partially, lies in the 0 Junta de Importaciones", a body of five permanent 
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members, including the head of INCOMEX. Decisions on all roughly 150,000 
annual prior license applications must be made by this body, which handles 
about 500 applications per day. The work load is even higher than implied, 
as the daily tasks are carried out typically by only 3 members 
of the Junta, the others, particularly the INCOr.1EX head, having other duties. 
The technical staff of the Junta is also small, fluctuating around 15 
professionals plus supporting employees. In spite of this staggering 
burden, the Junta is kept deliberately small to minimize the danger of 
corruption. The same reason is given for keeping its operations in Bogota, 
in spite of pressure from various reg:i.ons to decentralize the Junta's 
decision-making powers. The ,Junta decisions are, in principle, public; 
article 75 of Law 444 of 1Carch 1967 orders INCO!oIBX to publish weekly all 
import perml ts granLed, as well as publishlng other data on its operations. 
Decisions on rejections have been published off and ,on; their public 
knowledge for a while stim~lated fraudulent activities by individuals who 
offered the unlucky applicants false contacts which presumably would 
improve their chances in future applications. Since 1967 the turnover 
of Junta members has been low; for the three slots which are not ex-officio 
there have been only 8 members during the last five years (two died on 
the job). The Junta is widely respected for its hard work and honesty; 
it does lead a fishbowl existence. 
The Junta de Importaciones receives each month from the Junta .Monetaria~ 
the top monetary authority, an overall foreign exchange budget fer all 
imports, decided on the basis of actual and expected exchange earnings. 
The import Junta then regulates its approvals to keep within that limit; 
it may also be noted that it dislikes public announcements of changes in 
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the budget~ on the grounds that it may disturb its modus operandi. In 
particular, rumors of a cut in the monthly limit are said to produce sharp 
increases in license applications. 
The Junta members are the first to admit that they follow no fast 
and rigid rules when deciding on applications ( although unhelpful lists of 
11criteria11 can be found in the relevant legislation, as in Article 77 of 
Law 444), and that the process is highly subjective. There are no quotas 
for particular products, nor for firms, nor for regions. The major criterion 
is a protectionist one, but occasionally imports are let in if the quality of 
domestic output deteriorates markedly, or if domestic prices become "too" 
high. While Junta members say all the right things about scaring local 
monopolistic positions by such actions, the implementation is ad-hoc, with 
protectionist seuL.im.enL clorulnH-ting. Throughout the 1960s, imports in the 
prior license list have been informally subdivided into three groups; those for 
which licensing depends on local supply conditions of competing products, those 
generally aprroved, and those generally disapproved, but which are kept in 
the prior list to discourage monopolistic practices of domestic producers. 
The protectionist bias also shows in the occasional practice during the 
1960s of transferring items from the free to the prior license or prohibited 
categories as soon as a new plant begins to produce locally a. previously 
importable good (that transfer may actually be done before the plant begins 
to operate, to ward off inventory accumulation). During recent years, 
however, the number of items transferred into the prohibited list has 
dwindled. But the import control mechanisms has remained a key tool for 
protecting large new ventures, such as the automobile industry, for which 
special regimes and policies are established. Junta officials defend their 
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protectionist bias bluntly: given other policies and circumstances 
outside their control (exchange rate policy,' coffee prices, etc.), and given 
the need to ration foreign exchange, what better criterion can one find 
than to ask from potential importers whether or not they have checked to 
see whether the product they wish to bring in can be found within Colombia? 
.And in doubt is better to deny a request on protectionist grounds, it is 
said, a decision which after all can be reversed, than to allow imports 
demaging to a local producer, a decision more difficult to offset. A last 
argument given by Il'JCOMEX in favor of its protectionist stance will baffle 
the pure trade theorist: as there are very few firms exporting one hundred 
percent of their output, they say, weakening the local base of most firms 
by allowing 0 excessive l! competition from inports will hurt their exporting 
capacity. i\.s noti ccd in Chapter 3, this a:~gument bas short validityrun 
in a setting of monopolistic competition; its validity for the long run, 
however, is very doubtful under most normal assumptions regarding firm 
behavior. 
The process of establishing whether or not there is domestic 
production of a given item is not without loopholes; a given large company, 
for example, can have a subsidiary declare that it does not produce locally 
a given product, so that it is allowed to import it. The same subsidiary 
may declare to INCOMEX that it does produce the same i.tem, when a competitor 
of the large company requests a license. Given the limited staff of the 
Junta de Importaciones, it is not always possible to check on these 
ambiguities. It is said that, particularly durin£ 1965, subsidiaries 
were used in the way described. 
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Some Junta membere admit to a bias in favor of applicaticns from less 
developed regions within 8olombia, and from firms with good records in 
non-traditional exports (with or without the "Plan Vallejoil). As discussed 
below, the granting of global licenses typically involves negotiations 
regarding export targets. Firms with large tax payments are allegedly favored 
over those paying few taxes, even if there is no evidence of tax evasion; 
the argument given in that the g9vernment has a fiscal interest in 
channelling imports toward those firms which are good tax-yielding partners 
of the public sector, which chooses to use large tax payments as prima facie 
evidence of efficiency in the use of imported inputs. Although the 
Junta looks closely at past imports of the firms requesting fresh licenses, 
it claims to take into account the needs of new importers, again "by ear." 
Installed capacity is looked at, but so is employment; there is no obvious 
a priori reason to expect such subjective process by itself to lead to a 
bias in favor of capital-intensive activities greater than one in favor of 
labor-intensive firms. Some Junta members claim that their decisions are 
also influenced by the state of labor relations in the firm requesting 
a license; as "good11 labor relations are likely to be associated with high 
wages (and relatively low employment), a bias in favor of capital-intensity 
may be introduced this way. 
The Junta de Importaciones also examines the actual and expected 
inventories levels of the applying firm, and turns down a request if stocks 
11are deemed 11excessive. Inventories for 1+ to 6 months of production needs 
are considered reasonable? and are encouraged to save INCOMEX the paper 
work involved in more frequent requests associated with lower inventories. 
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This gentlemanly, case--by-case style of import control leads to biases 
not always fully recognized by those in charge of its operations.
10 Given 
the burden of work, and the speed with which applications must be 
handled, there is an inevitable tendency to accept without much analysis 
most "reasonable" requests from established, well-known (i.e., large) 
companies, and to examine more closely and reject, in case of doubt or 
stringency, those of lesser known, smaller newcomers, many of which may 
not even bother to apply. The Junta prides itself, with good reason, of 
remaining open to complaints from importers, and its members incredibly 
find time to listen to an unending stream of petitioners, whether powerful 
or not. Furthermore, it argues that at times of stringency, proportional 
cuts in import requests are larger for bigger than for smaller firms, and 
that it tends to overlook more easily faulty request forms from small 
than from large importers. 
But on balance, the larger and better known importers find it 
easier to communicate with the Junta tha,,1 others. 3iven the Colombian 
milieu, poter1tial sniall impo1-:ters may actually exaggerate in their 01•1n 
minds the complications of dealing with IHCOMEX, housed incidentally in 
imposing offices in the highest floors of the tallest building of Bogota. 
Some Junta officials candidly admit that this may be so, but given their 
strong beliaf in the necessity of control, argue that there are no other 
practical ways of handling the enormous mass of actual and potential 
so wrong, they ask, with tilting in favor of applicationsapplications. What is 
from long established corporations, with honorable records, and of being 
skeptical of new and unknown applicants, who may turn out to be no better 
than phony industrialists, disguised smugglers and black market operators? 
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In the Colombian social setting, where most people who "count n know each 
other directly or indirectly, it is not difficult for control officials to 
persuade themselves that all 11legitimate 1; requests are sooner or later 
handled appropriately. Another justification given for a bias against some 
small import requests is the fear that sue~ requests are simply a way to 
seek legal 'jwindow-dressingn for contraband; a shop,· it is alleged, would 
rely mainly on smuggled imports; but use an approved import license as 
a cover-up for its mostly illegal activities. A similar argument is 
sometimes given to justify flat prohibitions of some imports, as that 
way one is sure to know that if those goods are found within Colombia 
they come from contraband. 
The argument that large firms can use some imported capital goods 
at fuller capacity than small ones is also heard; for example, import 
requests for computers from small and medium size fi:nts are known to have 
been denied on the grounds that they could. not use computers at full 
capacity. Similar requests frcm larger firms have been approved. It is 
also argued, not without reason~ the.t bulk buying by the large firms 
abroad leads to dollar unit values for :Lmports lower than those which would 
be obtained by many firms purchasing small amounts each. 
The Junta keeps files of importers, including black or grey lists of 
those caught engaging in what it regards as illegal or undesirable practices. 
The total number of importers is said to reach about 12,000; it will be 
seen below, however, that the number of major importers is considerably 
less. 
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Ultimately, of course, the Junta can argue that the pattern of 
imports simply reflects industrial, financial and geographical concentaation 
in Colombia, which they neither reinforce nor weaken significantly. The 
elimination of import controls, by itself, is unlikely to change those 
structural facts, they add. To this difficult issue we will return below. 
Given the location of the Junta in Bogota, Bogota-based companies 
have an edge regarding access over those located elsewhere. Pleas from 
other cities, Cali and Medellfn in particular, for regional offices with 
the power to decide over prior license imports have been turned down mainly 
on the. grounds that such offices would be more subject to pressures 
originating in feelings of regional solidarity or in baser motives. At 
present, only a few items in the free list can be registered at the 27 
INCOMEX regional offices outslJ.e Bugota. The shuttling between provincial 
centers and Bogota is regarded as a small price to pay for maintaiinng 
uniform national standards, a:.~d minimizing the chances of corruption 
creeping into the decision-making process. 
In a rr.en.o to the l':.::i.nister of Development in December, 1969, a group 
of businessmen from the Cauca valley (where Cali is located) complained 
about excessive centralization of all governmental functions in Bogota, leading 
to "innumerable trips to arrange trivial details • " They argued that as a 
result, many corporate headquarters (if not whole plants) were being moved 
from that valley to Bogota, depriving the former of many important ancilliary 
activities, such as insurance, consulting and publicity. INCOi'vlEX was listed 
as the government office causing the largest number of trivial trips; there 
were others, however, such as the Superintendency of Prices, the Superintendency 
of Corporations, IFI, and the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Labor and 
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the Treasury (Tax Department). Centralized paper work associated with 
import licenses was the main target; the memo urged that six regional 
offices be given exchange quotas and be empowered to decide on license 
requests for spare parts, raw materials and other inputs strategic to keep 
production going, admitting that decisions on new capital goods or 
peculiar cases should remain centralized in Bogota. It is noteworthy 
that this group of businessmen asked for the decentralization of import 
controls not their abolition. 
It is generally admitted that re_quests under "commerceii are 
scrutinized more rigorously and rejeeted more frequently than those under 
"industry. 11 This is partly due to t:h.e bias favoring big established 
firms, but also to a feeling that i tem.s reql;ested under commerce are less 
"essential 11 than th-.~ othe.r·s . Commerce, it is also argued, brings in a 
general variety of imports to add to more or less ample stocks, and some 
delay is ~likely to harm very much of anything~ while industrial requests 
are of a very specific nature and are expected to get into production with 
a shorter lag; at any ra.te, the pressing nature of industrial needs is 
easier to demonstrate than that of commercial requests. Whatever the reason, 
this fact further reinforces the bias against smaller industrial firms, 
which rely more on commercial intermediaries for imported inputs than 
the larger firms. 
To summarize some of the problems of the small industrial firm, 
particularly one located outside Bogota: in spite of its more difficult 
access to credit, its inventories e.s a percentage of sales tends to be 
higher than those of the larger firms, anyway; attempts to lower inventories 
of imported items by relying on commercial intermediaries will be hampered 
by the greater difficulties of the latter in obtaining permits, and by their 
charging premia-inclusive prices for those items for which permits have 
been obtained; attempts to lower imported inventories run the risk of 
stopping production at times of crisis if EJCOMEX fails to handle license 
requests quickly. 
Applications in the 11officialn category are in principle subjected 
to the same procedure as others; as they involve duty-free imports, recently 
there have been special efforts made to ascertain that they do not bring 
into the country goods produced locally. Attempts to influence the Junta 
by open flexing of political muscle appear to be surprisingly limited; 
import requests from the Armed Forces and Congress, of course, receive 
very careful treatment, and rejections of Lhose .rey_uests 1::LI:'e documented 
particularly well. But there~ occasional rejections of applications 
from those sources (often, alas, on ultra-protectionist grounds), as well 
as from other powerful public agencies. On balance, however, there is a 
nresumntion that official reauests should be given nrioritv. and are said 
~ -- -,1,; - -- .. . . • ._, .... ... .. 
to fare better than private requests, particularly at times of stringency. 
Traditionally, non-reimbursable license requests are said to have 
had better chances of approval than reimbursable ones, simply because they 
did not involve claims against Central Bank foreign exchaDge, and typically 
involved capital goods not produced in Colombia. Frequently they also 
involved large :i;nfblic sector projects a..Dd international committments. More 
recently, however, both :protectionist and equity considerations have led 
to higher rates of refusals for non-reimbursable requests. The budding 
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Colombian capital goods industry has exerted pressure in this direction, 
also pointing out the low duties (and frequent exemptions) on capital good 
imports. Local enterpreneurs have also loudly complained when direct 
foreign investors have been allowed to bring in machinery, with non­
reimbursable licenses, whose importation is not possible when requested 
via the reimbursable category; it is (correctly) felt that such a situation 
puts the local industrialist at an unfair disadvantage when competing in 
the local market with foreign owned firms. It may be noted, incidentally, 
that INCOMEX generally follows a policy of non-discrimination between 
import requests from locally and foreign owned companies located within 
Colombia. More on this below. At a more pedestrian level, the possibility 
of importing autos with non-reimbursable licenses, for example, would lead, 
according ·Lo INCOMEX, Lo all kinds of illegal triangular deals; the tendency, 
therefore, is to apply the same protectionist or equity criteria whether 
or not the license request is reimbursable. 
Searching for equity among established firms, the Junta often handles 
several import requests from different ccm.panies for a given product~ 
particularly critical raw materials, in one bunch. For example, when 
several beer companies apply for imported hops, these requests are 
considered togethe~, so as to avoid giving one company advantages over 
the others simply on the basis of a temporarily better access to imported 
inputs. In the case of new comers to the industry, projected output is 
taken into conside1Aation; for others, historical. imports provide a first 
approximation to actual needs. When some important raw material is both 
imported and produced locally, and the latter is more expensive and/or of a 
lower quality than the former, mixing rules are enforced, i.e., for each 
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imported pound each company must purchase two locally, again to avoid 
giving companies unfair advantage based on better access fo the superior 
imported inputs. When there are no obviously equitable arrangements 
possible, there is a tendency to deny all requests; it is argued that 
it is better for all to do without imports than for a few to benefit 
from unfair advantages arising from a lucky access to those goods. Such 
favortism, even if random, would cast douot on the honesty and fairness of 
the Junta. Like Caesar's wife, the Junta knows that it must not only be 
honest, but appear honest, even at the risk of being stern and unpleasant. 
(The possibility of auctioning off licenses is not considered to lie within 
the rules of the game.) 
In the case of requests for global licenses, covering investment projects, 
the relevant department of INCOJYIEX is supposed to cou.r·u.inate their study 
of those projects with the National Planning Department. The Committee on 
Global Licenses, which began operating during 1969, includes besides INCOMEX 
and the Planning Department, the Ministry of Development and IFI, a public 
body which finances arid sometimes rlms j_ndustrial projects; this Committee 
has witnessed on occasion bureaucratic rivalries among its members. The 
Junta de Importaciones retains the ultimate power to accept or reject the 
applications, and there have been cases when the Junta has taken decisions 
contrary to the resolutions of the mixed Committee on Global Licenses. 
The data which are required together with the request for global licenses 
are extensive, and potentially permit a fairly comprehensive benefit-cost 
study of each investment project. r,_;y L1pression, however, is that such 
studies are not carried out, or at least not very thoroughly. There are 
only five professionals in the division of Global licenses, each of whom is 
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is supposed to stud:')r about 5 projects per week.
11 
However, this mechanism 
has been increasinely used to insure that new projects, particularly those 
granted tax or other advantages, commit part of their expecte.d output 
for exports; for several projects specific export targets have been laid 
down at the time of their approval by INCOMEX, in the form of formal 
contracts. It is not in the HJCOMEX style to insist rigidly on the exact 
compliance with such targets, but the companies know that systematic 
departures from those promises can lead to a displeased and colder INCOMEX 
in the future. Once a global license has been obtained, ordinary requests 
charged against it are typically granted almost automatically; furthermore, 
changes in the specifications of equipment to be imported are allowed 
with relative ease. The processing of the global license request itself is 
taking an average of about two months, although not surprisingly, there are 
substantial variations from this average, depending on the nature of the 
project. It may be noted that in reviewing global licenses INCOMEX 
examines the proposed ways of financing those imports, and can suggest 
The 19-page questionnaire which must be completed in applying for a 
global license is admittedly terrifying for a small entre:preneur, who in 
all likelihood needs to hire a consultant to fill it out. IHCOMEX has 
been considering requiring a briefer questionnaire for smaller businessmen, 
but as of September 1971 this had not been done. 
In many cases, the same project processed by IlxCOl'iiEX with an eye on 
import demand will also be analyzed by other members of the Committee on 
Global Licenses, and the Cammi"'.::tee on Royalties (which supervises these 
payments abroad), which have other major preoccupations besides import demand. 
For example, all major direct foreign investments in Colombia must by 
law be approved by the Planning office. Projects financed by IFI will 
of course be examined by that institution. As noted above, the coordination 
among different public agencies in this area leaves much to be desired; 
overlap and conflict abound. 
The mechanism for granting global licenses, originally designed 
inter alia to save paper-work and to avoid complications at customs, and 
the associated 11 grava,men unico•i or single tax have come under increasing 
fire from within the government not only for lacking sufficient corrdination 
with bodies outs id.e HfCOMEX, but also for excessive generosity in reducing 
tariff rates on capital goods inputs. 
Ordinary and global lice:ises are norillally examined b;,;r INCOMEX following 
the chronologica,l order of presentation; ordinary licenses are decided 
usually within a month or a month ru-:d a half of presentation, while for 
global licenses the waiting period is naturall:r longer and less predictable. 
Extensions and mofifications of ordinary licenses take less than a month. 
r:NCOt~IBX claims that urge11t requests are handled even faster, if necessar'J 
in a day (say in the case when parts are essential to prevent production 
breakdowns). Rejections of applications ar8 accompanied by the reason or 
reasons given by the Junta for such a decision (there are 72 such possible 
reasons listed by the Junta); it is frequent, particularly during times of 
severe exchange shortage, that new applications will rapidly follow the 
rejection, but during more relaxed times, as during 1971, the (few) 
rejections are taken more seriously. Once approval is secured, and imports 
have cleared customs, there is no particular difficulty in obtaining the 
foreign excha".lge for payment. With me!l'lories of the piling up of commercial 
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arrears of 1955-56, and of the less dramatic one of 1966-67, still fresh 
in mind, authorities have been careful not to issue import licenses 
beyond expected exchange earnings since late 1966. 
It is part of the INCOMEX style to avoid if possible having to say 
NO formally; so, particularly with global licenses, negative signals are 
frequently sent informal.ly, and are never registered as rejections. 
Furthermore, as its policies are by now fairly well known, many potential 
importers do not even bother to apply, saving themselves the time, trouble 
. 12and expense of app1ying. 
Ordinary· import permits are good only for five months;13 if imports 
are not brought in within that time, a new permit or three-month extensions 
of the old one must be secured. It has been argued that such limitations 
put the Colombian importer in a bargaining disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign 
suppliers, who aware of th~ time pressure faced by Colombians in shopping 
around, shade their prices upward. It is Il'JCOMEX 1 s expectation that goods 
imported in the "Industrial II category will be used only by the company 
to which the license has been issued; when quest~oned about the legality 
of reselling imported merchandise, for "industrial" companies, the answers 
were surprisingly fuzzy. 'l'he license itself is clearly non-negotiable, 
as it is is~ued only to a specific company or person. The reselling of 
the imported items by industrial users is apparently not strictly illegal, 
but frowned upon by Il'JCO:MEX~ if nothing else because it implies that 
nnormal" requirements stated in the resolution 15 request form were 
misleading or false. Companies known to be systematically selling part of 
their imported industrial inputs to others are punished by INCOMEX with 
total or partial rejections of future re~uests; similar ?unishment is dealt 
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to individuals or com1)anies which are discovered trying to import under 
several social or private names. INCOMEX's point is that they want to 
know exactly how many imports can be traced to each industrial firm or 
individual. INCOMEX, however, does not punish temporary 11swapping 11 or 
"lending" of imported items among industrial firms; indeed, it finds 
such practice as quite reasonable, particularly if done during periods 
of stringency and in a linen-speculative ii mariner. Apparently~ during 1971 
very little re-selling or swapping of non-commercial imports took place, 
al·though some IHCOMEX officials indicated that such practice was widespread 
during difficult years, e.g., 1967. The fact that most imports are 
purchased directly by companies which use them as inputs in the production 
of other commodities, so that arms-length market prices for those inputs 
are not obocrvcd in Colombia, makes it difficult, lf nut impossible, to 
establish exactly the premia attached to import licenses, a premia which 
in any case is very likely to fluctuate sharply between years {e.g., between 
1967 and 1971). 
It also follows that it is difficult to establish the meaning of price 
control for imported 11industrial 11 inputs. In the case of "commercial" imports, 
according to regulations, INCOMEX should theoretically coordinate its 
activities with the Superintendencia de Precios (Price Control Board), to 
regulate the margin at which imported goods are resold, i.e., to control 
the premia derived from licenses. S~ch control, however, is very sporadic 
and unsystematic, and takes place mainly when somebody makes sca..~dala 
about excessive margins. Nevertheless, INCOI".iEX claims that import controls 
are superior to tariffs, inter alia, because they avoid making imports more 
expensive, a doubtful claim in view of the loose control over the license 
premia. 
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Conventional wisdom in Colombia regards the profitability of large 
importing commercial houses as very high; in particular, hardware stores 
reselling imports are popularly considered gold mines. The Junta argues that 
it tries to spread out import permits among commercial importers as much 
and as fairly as it can. 
There are more or less subtle ways in which the Junta discriminates 
according to country of origin of potential imports. Requests to import 
television sets, for example~ are said to have better chances of approval 
if exported from Spain rather than the U.S., both because Spain has a 
bilateral payments agreement with Colombia and because the au.thorities 
consider that the local industry will have an easier time competing with 
Spanish in contrast with U.S. sets. :Even where there e,re no explicit 
bilateral agreements, the Junta de facto administers 11gentlemen 's agreements" 
with countries such as Japan, which purchase from Colombia outside coffee 
agreement channels in exchange for Colombian commitments to import their 
goods. These games, of course, are also played by countries without 
explicit generalized im:9ort controls, PVF>n if' thPy prP:::il"h mnl+.il:::i.+.Pr:::il 
trade (particularly to partners with whom they a.re in surplus). Some 
Colombian officials complain that socialist c~l.l!ltries with which Colombia 
has bilateral payments agreements do not advertise their goods as vigorously 
as they could among potential importers; often the Junta has to nudge 
importers so that they divert their purchases in that direction, for which 
areas import licenses are granted more readily than for imports from, say, 
the dollar area. But the 4uantitative importance of such trade remains 
small; as shown in Chapter II, during 1967-69, less than 3 percent of 
Colombian imports came from what the IMF-DOT calls Soviet areas. 
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As the Colombian foreign exchange position improved, particularly 
during 1971 and 1972, the role of foreign aid, and particularly that of U.S. 
tied aid, declined; the use of import controls to enfcrce tying also declined 
accordingly. In earlier years, however, INCOMEX and related institutions 
took strong meesures to divert purchases toward U.S. products; these included 
favorable credit conditions, exemption from advance-deposit requirements, 
and direct pressure on importers to buy from the U.S. 'Ihose were the days 
of' bitter wrangling over 11positive 11 and 11negativeil lists, 11 additionality," 
14
etc. U.s. officials were in the awkward position of simultaneously 
urging Colombians to libere,lize import controls~ to use controls to enf'orce 
tying, and to stop using controls to divert imports toward bilateral 
partners, such as Spain and Socialist countries. 
'Ihe INCOMEX performance Ci!:.£.!! 197'1 was generally praised by industrial 
entrepreneurs interviewed during the middle part of that year. In 
almost all cases they compared it very favorably with the pre-1967 situation, 
for which stories typically associated with import controls were told 
{delays, cor:ruption, inefficiency, P.tc.). The flexrbility, efficiency and 
honesty of INCOMEX is also compared favorably with those of customs; 
the coordination between HICOMEX and customs, incidentally, is quite poor. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that most of these entrepreneurs ca.me 
from relatively large companies, and that the foreign exchange situation 
was quite relaxed during 1971, particularly in contrast with 1967 and earlier 
yeras. 'Ihe major complaint against DJCOM.EX desls with imports of spare 
parts, for which delays of even one month in the hand.ling of import requests 
are a nuisance. Frequently, small spa:;.~e parts are simply smuggled into 
the country by employees se~t specially for that purpose to Miami and New York. 
It may be note,1 that the free or black market r,eso rate during 1971 was only 
10 or 15 percent above the ce1·tifice.te rate {and less than that during 
1972), so using excha~ge from this source was not particularly expensive. 
INCOMEX, of course, is aware of thsee goings--on, and has been considering 
ways of legalizing the aitn;;:.tion, such as ex.pauding the "m.lnor" import 
category, whkh now aJ.lows imports worth less than $20 (less than $40 for 
books) without prior license noJ:' registra~:.on. 
Entrepreneurs, p'.:l.rti s:!1.~Larly those in charge of large companies, find 
I1'IC0MEX on the whole &.. bulwa1'.'l1: against foreign competition and at the same 
time an even mo:;:oe re~_iable sup:i::.:lier of' cheap i:nported inputs. Nowada;y-s 
the few controve:rsies between entrepreneurn and. IlJCONEX deal more with 
imports which Jchat institution has a1.1owed to come into the country, than 
with denials of i:r-1porL :.:-e 1ues t,::; • 
Beside~ the smuggling of spare parts and some consumer goods, such as 
furs, perfumes, jewelry and cigarettes, INCm-:P..X feels that the system is 
relatively free of ~eaks and well o~ganized, in the sense that importers 
know what to expect. Its officials argue, not without reason, that the 
combination of moderate tariffs pluA import controls forms a more powerful 
combination against smuggling than a situation with higher tariffs and 
no import controls . A key element in their reasoning is that as more 
items are taken 011·~ of the prohibited list into the prior license one, 
more uncertainty will be planted in the minds of would-be smugglers, whose 
profit margins could be :.·educed or w:'i.ped out if I27C0::1EX all of a sudden permits 
imports of mo<ierately taxed goods . 
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The performance of the INCOAEX import control system has a good 
reputation even outside Colombia; officials from other Latin .American 
countries have visited Bogota to study the workings of it 3 for possible 
application in their own countries. 
INCOMEX does not handle the further steps an importer must make to 
obtain foreign exchange to pay for his goods, once they arrive in Colombia. 
This is the responsibility of the Central Bank, with vhich the importer 
must make a deposit in pesos equal to 95 percent of the needed exchange, 
twenty days before making an application for an exchange registration. 
Proof that goods have cleared cust.oms must also be presented. At this stage, 
the request for exchange is granted very quickly; typically the exchange 
disbursement takes place about thirty da~'-s after the merchandise has gone 
through customs •. The Central Bank, however, may· double check with INCOMEX 
on unit dollar prices, to avoid overj_nvoicing. 
Given the relatively relaxed. excl--.ange position of Colombia during 
1971-72, it may be asked why no more dramatic liberalization steps have 
hr:ii:>n +.i:ikPn - .Tnn+.A. nf'f'i r>i R.1 i:: reply that, in fact, very few import requests 
are being rejected; it may be estimated that the rejection rate during 
those two years has fluctuated around 10 to 15 percent of the value of all 
applications. Some officials favor placing most items in the prior 
license list, eliminating both the free and the prohibited lists. The 
post-1967 trend, however, seems to be a very gradual expansion of the free 
list, and an equally slow contraction of the prohibited one. The sole 
change of an item from the prohibited to t~e prior license list is said 
to have powerful {and desirable) effects on local producers. If just 
1962 and 1971 are compared, as in Tables IV- and IV- a contraction of 
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both the free a..'ld the prohibited lists is apparent. There remains, 
nevertheless, a lingering fear that without import controls, and in 
spite of tariffs, there would be a cataclysmic upsurge of imports 
{a la 1966?), and massive bankrupcies among local producers. 
anThe Treaty of Cartagena which cre.ated the Andean group calls for 
elimination of administrative import restrictions among member countries, 
but even for those imports there are at present doubts whether the 
elimination of import controls will be very widespread or general. 
Footnotes to Chapter l 
Mrs. He:nninia Martinez Neufeld first explained to me the subtleties of* 
the Colombian import licensing system. Lillian Barros, Jose Francisco 
Escandon, Stephen Kadish~ Miguel Urrutia and Francisco Thoumi were also 
particularly helpful in the preparation of this chapter. Last but not 
least I must acknowledge the help received from many officials of Ii'JCOMEX 
in Bogota, who were remarkably open and cooperative. Criticisms in this 
chapter toward the import control system must be clearly separated from 
any judgement regarding the •11ay they carry out their tasks; indeed, my 
impression of INCO:MEX off~.cials is that they are an unusually hardworking, 
dedicated and public spirited g:roup ._ 
1. The lists are forma"'.ly approved by the Superior Council of Foreign 
Trade (Consejo Superior de Comercio Exterior), under advise from INCOMEX, 
which acts as its technical secretariat. That Collncil is presided by the 
Minister of Developme~:t, and also includes ~he Ministers of Foreign 
Relations, Treasury and Agriculture, plus the head of the Planning office, 
the manager of the Central Bank~ the manager of the Feder~tion of Coffee 
Growers, the manager o~ IFI, the director of PROEXPO, and the director of 
INCOMEX. This group also forms the core of the Council of Economic 
Policy, which includes also the President of the Republic, and the Ministers 
of Public Works and of Laber. These two Councils plus the Junta :Monetaria., 
form the three key policy making bodies in the economic field. The director. 
of INCOMEX is a membe:;.- of the three bodies. 'iJithin INCOMEX, which covers 
all aspects of foreign trade, the nJunta de Importaciones 11 handles the 
import control system. 
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2. Resolution 22 of September 22, 1970, also limits the free list to the 
reimbursable category, and to commodities originating in the same country 
where they have been purchazed. The free list applicable to LAFTA 
countries is somewhat larger than that described above. 
3. This section relies heavily on the INF 1s annual Report o:i Exchange 
Restrictions, and on interviews with Colombian and officials in several 
interamerican and international institutions. 
4. All import registations were divided as follows: 
Official Market 
Free
Government Private Market 
1955 21% 7c:;% l-1-%I ./ 0 
1956 21 58 21 
1957-First quarter 18 67 15 
5. The free rate, generated by a thin market, was influenced not only 
by expectations and other usual factors, but also by special circumstances, 
particularly cor1ditions in neigh·borir1g ·venezuela. Unregistered Colombo-
Venezuelan border trade played en important role in the fluctuations 
o:f the free rate . The free rate, eliminated in November 1966, acted as 
a safety valve for the import control system; generally authorities looked 
the otter way if imports were financed through the free market. 
6. Some authorities justified their strict licensing of capital good 
imports with the curious argument that they would simply lead to higher 
demand for imported raw materials in the future. Some observers considered 
that import restrictions weighed more heavily on capital goods than on 
raw materials and even consumer goods during 1963 and 1964. 
l 
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7. Fearing the inflationary repercussions of supplying dollars at 
the import rate of 9 Pesos purchased in the free market at about twice 
that amount, a differential covered by borrowing from the central Bank, 
the 11Junta Monetaria11 established a 13 .5 Peso rate for minor exports 
in June 1965. An ulterior mot·ive in taking this step, discouraging 
to minor exports, was to prepare the way for a devaluation of the import 
rate, also to 13.5 Pesos, Technical advisers to the Junta and international 
civil servants had preferred a 14 Peso rate, both for minor exports and 
for imports. But given the political climate, 13.5 Pesos (a round 50 
percent above the 9 Peso rate) wae the maximum acceptable to the authorities. 
To show their faith in the feasilibity of that parity, the Colombians 
launched i_n September 1965 the liberalization program. More on this in 
the next cta~ter. 
8. When references are made to INCOMEX, in general, they refer both to 
formal regulations and informal opinions of IHCOMEX officials interviewed 
during July-September of 1971, and during August 1972. In fact, the 
"~J1_].nta de Import.a.ciones u is only a part of the whole IfJC01·TEX organization, 
which also covers other aspects of foreign trade. 
9. The impressive evidence on overinvoicing in pharmaceuticals and 
other industries is discussed in Constantine V. Vaitos, "Transferencia 
de Recurses y Preservaci6n de Rentas Monopolisticas, 11 Revista de Planeaci6n 
y Desarrollo, Vol. II? No. 2, July 1971 (published by the national Planning 
Department, Bogot~), pp. 35-72. For the pharmaceutical companies in 
the sample, an ove~pricing averaginG 155 percent was found. Over­
invoicing is also said to occur in items such as books and machine tools, 
for which it is more difficult to ascertain exact prices, due to quality 
differences and heterogeneity of specifications. 
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10. There are similarities between the Colombian style of import controls 
and the operating manner of committees in charge of undergraduate admissions 
in places like Yale, where demand also exceeds supply. At both places there 
is great resistance to formalize quotas, regarded as rigid, and a tendency 
to fudge criteria until they become a subjective Jell-0. Those controlling 
decisions resent any attempt at defining clear-cut objective rules, which 
are easily enough shown to be unable to cover fairly all possible cases, 
even when those rules would yield the same results as the committees in 95 
percent .of all cases • For the sake of that 5 percent power, the administrators 
prefer gentlemanly ambiguity. 
11. INCOMEX curiously argues that even though its staff may not have time to 
carry out careful cost-benefit studies, the process of requesting massive 
data from entrepreneurs planning a new project will force businessmen to 
re-think their venture carefully. This is bilt one example of the paternalistic 
attitude often found among IHCOMEX officials. In some cases, the study of 
a given project is reduced to a quick visit to the plant proposing an 
enlargement. INCOMEX expects that requests for global licenses involve 
projects which are in a fairly advanced state of study by the firm. 
12. All requests for import licenses must be accompanied by a 100 Peso fee, 
and more recently, by an additional 50 Peso charge (a total of about US$ 7). 
The paperwork required for making an application must also represent small 
but significant expense for companies, particularly in the case of global 
licenses. Such an eXJ)ense is likely to oe proportionally higher for smaller 
firms. IIiJCOMEX finances itself partly out of the import license fees, which 
gives it additional autonomy in contrast with government agencies more 
dependent on the national budget. 
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13. When approval is granted to an import request,, copies of the import 
registration are sent to the Central Bank, the Customs office and to the 
Colombian consul nearest to the foreign city from which the goods are 
to shipped. The Colombian consul may not issue the proper shipping 
authorization without that document. 
14. See Thomas L. Hutcheson and Richard C. Porter, The Cost of Trying Aid: 
A Method and Some Colombian Estimates, Princeton Studies in International 
Finance No. 30, March 1972, particularly pp. 17-20, The infamous 
"additionality 11 clause in U.S. aid was abolished during the visit of 
President Carlos Lleras Restrepo to the U.S., in June 1969. 
